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Taking Decisions Seriously:
A Review of Rethinking fhe New
Deal Court; The Structure o f a
Constitutional Revolution
RICHARD D. FRIEDMAN

The New Deal era is one of the great turning points of American constitutional history. The
receptivity of the Supreme Court to regulation by state and federal governments increased dramatically during that period. The constitutionalism that prevailed before Charles Evans Hughes
became Chief Justice in 1930 was similar in most respects to that of the beginning of the twentieth century. The constitutionalism that prevailed by the time Hughes’ successor Harlan Fiske
Stone died in 1946 is far more related to that of the end of the century.
How this transformation occurred is a crucial and enduring issue in constitutional history.
How we perceive both the Supreme Court and the process by which its members are selected
depends significantly on how we view the process by which the Court develops and changes
constitutional doctrine. To what extent are the Justices’ decisions shaped by the doctrines
enunciated in the prior decisions of the Court, to what extent by their own personal ideologies,
and to what extent by external events and conditions, including political pressure exerted in one
direction or another?
The story often told about the constitutional transformation of the New Deal era is
that political pressure on the Court was critical, Franklin D. Roosevelt’s landslide re-election victory in 1936 and his campaign for
Court-packing the next year having induced a
conservative Court to change directions. Advocates of this view-and indeed anyone who

is interested in the history of the Court during
this era-will now have to contend with the
arguments presented with enormous skill by
Barry Cushman in his stimulating and meticulous new book, Rethinking the New Deal
Court: The Structure of a Constitutional
Revolution.
Professor Cushman does not deny that
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“dramatic changes in constitutional jurisprudence” occurred during the New Deal era; no
sensible observer could do so. Rather, he attempts “to recharacterize both the jurisprudence that changed and the mechanics by
which it changed, approaching the phenomenon examined as a chapter in the history of
ideas rather than as an episode in the history of
politics.”l Cushman’s account of constitutional
transformation is therefore “internal” in the
sense that he emphasizes the interplay of precedent and of the Justices’ own ideologies
rather than the influence of external political
pressures. Broadly, he contends that the doctrinal context in which the Justices operate has
a great deal to do with their jurisprudence, as
do the political, economic, social, cultural, and
intellectual contexts:
Judges are participants not merely in
a political system, but in an intellectual tradition in which they have been
trained and immersed, a tradition that
has provided them with the conceptual equipment through which they
understand legal disputes. To reduce
constitutional jurisprudence to a political football, to relegate law to the
status of dependent variable, is to
deny that judges deciding cases experience legal ideas as constraints on
their own political preferences.2
Thus, Cushman refuses to treat the Justices’
opinions as shams, merely as tools to give a
veneer of legitimacy to results reached on other
grounds. Treating the opinions seriously,rather
than as counters to be placed either on the left
side or on the right side of a grand political
divide, entails a great deal of hard work.
Cushman has not shied away from it, and he
has done it very well.
More specifically, Cushman argues that an
integrated web of thought that had dominated
constitutionaljurisprudence since the Civil War
collapsed before 1937; Cushman identifies
Nebbia v. New Y ~ r kthe
, ~ 1934 decision upholding a New York statute regulating the price
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of milk, as “occup[ying] center stage” in the
Court’s abandonment of the old f r a m e ~ o r k . ~
He argues that the reach of Nebbia extended
far beyond its immediate doctrinal context.
This point he illustrates well with an extended
discussion of the Court’s jurisprudence concerning yellow-dog contracts. The majority’s
ultimate grant of constitutional approval of
laws prohibiting these contracts, and thus removing one of the great obstacles to the organization of labor, reflected Nebbia’s expansion
of the domain of activities deemed to invoke
the public interest. “Thus,” he concludes pointedly, though perhaps with some slight overstatement, “the fundamental issues that would
divide the Justices in the seminal labor cases
of modem American constitutional law were
decided not in response to the political pressures of 1937, but in a 1934 dispute over the
price of milk in upstate New Y ~ r k . ”Conser~
vative-seeming decisions of 1935 and 1936
represented no backsliding from Nebbia,
Cushman contends, and in the climactic liberal decisions of the spring of 1937 the Court’s
swing members, Hughes and Owen Roberts,
did not retreat from positions they had taken
earlier or recoil in the face of political pressure.
Rather, these Justices built on the advances
they had made in Nebbia. Change continued at
a rapid pace, but continued changes were attributable to the influence of the Justices appointed by Roosevelt, beginning with Hugo L.
Black in the fall of 1937.
Though we disagree in some significant
details, I agree with much of Cushman’s account. Like him, I believe there is no persuasive evidence that the 1936 election or the
Court-packing plan produced the celebrated
decisions of the spring of 1937, and like him I
believe that changes in the personnel of the
Court were the principal cause of the constitutional transformation. The latter point is one
that Cushman makes with delicious irony.
Though Hughes and Roberts did not always
join the liberal wing of the Court, they were
far more likely to do so than the Justices they
replaced in 1930-William Howard Taft and
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Edward T. Sanford, respectively-and until the
1937 Term their votes were essential for liberal victories. And so Cushman ends his book
with this striking statement: “The presidential
author of ‘the Constitutional Revolution of
1937,’ then, was not the man the people had
overwhelmingly returned to office the preceding November. It was, instead, the man the electorate had repudiated in Roosevelt’s favor in
1932: Herbert Hoover.”6
Part I of Cushman’s book directly challenges the proposition that the decisions of the
spring of 1937 were a response to pressures
created by the Court-packing plan or
Roosevelt’s re-election. His aim here, he says,
is to “create sufficient intellectual space” to
allow for the plausible development of “an alternative internal account.”’ Cushman argues
in some depth that the plan was doomed from
the start, and so “[tlhe justices had ample reason to be confident that constitutional capitulation was not necessary to avert the Courtpacking threat. Certainly they had reason to In Rethinking the New Deal Court, Barry Cushman
doubt that immediate, total, and unconditional argues that the Court‘s thinking changed before the
1937 Court-packing episode, and that its
surrender was required.”’
abandonment of the old framework was evident as
The first, stronger part of this conclusion early as 1934 in Nebbia v. New York. That decision
upheld a New York statute regulating the price of milk,
seems somewhat dubious to me. Although which had been challenged by Leo Nebbia (pictured),
Cushman is clearly correct that the plan faced a grocer from Rochester, New York. Many were
formidable obstacles from the start, a contem- surprised that the Court upheld the minimum price
law that had been passed to protect the New York
porary observer would have had to give due milk industry from suffering from damaging price wars.
weight to the tremendous strength with which
Roosevelt began the battle and the possibility
Cushman also argues powerfully that the
that he could compromise and secure the addition of a smaller number of extra Justices than 1936 election did not account for the Court’s
the six he had s ~ u g h tBut
. ~ the weaker conclu- decisions of 1937. The Court had felt no comsion, that the Justices had reason to believe that punction about striking down New Deal legistotal and immediate surrender was not neces- lation after the 1934 Democratic landslide, he
sary, seems quite correct to me. For example, points out; why would the 1936 election, in
upholding the National Labor Relations Act on which the Republican opposition took a much
its face and as applied to large employers would more moderate stance, have appeared so clearly
have severely undercut the Administration’s ar- to be a constitutional referendum-and why
gument that the Court was trying to destroy would the devastating Democratic losses of
the New Deal; to make this point, the Court 1938 not have appeared to be a constitutional
did not have to give the Administration the referendum with the opposite response?
extraordinarily sweeping victory that it did in Cushman is correct that there is an element of
the companion cases to United States v. Jones post hoc, ergo propter hoe (“after this, there& Laughlin Corp.‘O
fore because of this”) in the arguments of those
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who emphasize the 1936 election.” The 1934
midterm Democratic landslide, he points out,
did not cause a flood of liberal decisions; quite
the contrary, it was after that election that the
Court issued most of its decisions striking down
New Deal legislation.And the rightward-swinging midterm election of 1938 did not cause
Hughes and Roberts to take more conservative
positions. If one is committed to the idea that
some external political developmentmust have
caused the pattern of the Court’s decisions,
then the 1936 election is the obvious candidate, by process of elimination. Absent that
commitment,though, there is no good basis for
concluding that the 1936 election must have
altered the course of decisions.
Not being so committed, Cushman seeks
to explain the Court’s decisions in terms of
evolving constitutional doctrine. In great detail, he works through the cases of the early
twentieth century dealing with price regulation,
culminating with Nebbia. Earlier cases had
adhered to the doctrine that the state and federal governments could constitutionally regulate only those industries that were “affected
with a public interest.” But Justice Roberts’
opinion for a bare majority of the Court in
Nebbia discarded this limitation. There is, he
wrote, “no closed class or category of businesses affected with a public interest.” That
phrase meant “no more than that an industry,
for adequate reason, is subject to control for
the public good.” There was nothing “peculiarly sacrosanct about the price one may charge
for what he makes or sells”; prices, like any
other aspect of a business’s operations, could
be constitutionallyregulated by reasonable legislation when the public welfare demanded it.I2
As Cushman contends, Nebbia was a case
of enormous importance, because it signaled a
greater receptivity to price regulationI3 and,
more broadly, an integrated view that due process demanded of economic regulations only
that they “have a reasonable relation to a proper
legislative purpose, and [be] neither arbitrary
nor di~criminatory.”’~
I am hesitant to apply
Cushman’s label of “revolutionary” only be-
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cause I do not believe the case called for results that would have been implausible under
prior doctrine. Indeed, Justice Roberts was able
to cite a large number of precedents supporting an expansive view of legislative power. Of
course, there were cases going the other way,
but the doctrine invalidating price regulation
unless the industry fit within an amorphous
category of “affected with a public interest”
was already anomalous and unpredictable. In
refusing to accept this standard for measuring
constitutionality, Roberts smoothened and advanced constitutional law, but I am not so sure
that he fundamentally transformed it. As
Cushman readily acknowledges, Nebbia did
not suggest that the Court was yet willing to
abandon any substantive due process constraints at all on economic regulation. Roberts
and, to a lesser extent, Hughes continued to
support such constraints throughout their tenure, well after the drama of 1937.
Because Nebbia knocked out the theoretical underpinningsfor constitutional challenges
to price regulations, one would expect the five
Justices forming the Nebbia majority to support the constitutionality of minimum wage
laws, which are, and were conceived of being,
a form of price regulation. And so the five did,
in West Coast Hotel v. Parrish.15But the mystery is why the year before, in Morehead v.
New Yovk ex rel. Tipaldo,’6Roberts joined the
four conservatives to invalidate a minimum
wage law. Cushman has an intriguing theory,
though one that I ultimately find unpersuasive.
In Tipaldo, the state did not squarely ask
the Court to overrule Adkins v. Children’s
Hospital, l7 in which the Court had invalidated
a federal minimum wage law. Justice Butler’s
opinion for the Court noted this fact, and focused at first on the question of whether the
statute involved in Tipaldo was distinguishable
from the one involved in Adkins. As Cushman
says, “The only possible reason for Butler to
rest the majority opinion on such a narrow
ground is that Roberts insisted on it as the price
of his v ~ t e . ”According
’~
to Roberts’ later recollection,
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I stated to [Butler] that I would concur in any opinion which was based
on the fact that the State hadnot asked
us to re-examine or overrule Adkins
and that, as we found no material difference in the facts of the two cases,
we should therefore follow the Adkins
case.I9

After Justice Stone circulated a dissent contending that Adkins should be overruled, however, Justice Butler added another section to
his own opinion, declaring the continued validity of Adkins. To his later regret, Roberts
did not remonstrate.
Why did Roberts go along with this addition to Butler’s opinion? His reluctance to write
separate concurrences, the fact that the additional material was in effect dicta, and the press
of business at the close of Term might help
answer this question. The deeper mystery is
why he joined with the conservatives in the
first place. Cushman offers, somewhat tentatively, a surprising theory. Roberts, he suggests,
would have voted to overrule Adkins, but only

Professor Cushman makes the point that although Chief
Justice Hughes (pictured below with his wife) and
Justice Roberts did not always join the liberal wing of
the Court, they were far more likely to do so than the
Justices they replaced in 1930-William Howard Taft
and Edward T. Sanford, respectively. He believes that
their joining the Court, not the threat of Court-packing,
was responsible for the so-called Constitutional
Revolution of 1937.

if there was a majority for doing so. Chief Justice Hughes, who dissented on the grounds
that Adkins was distinguishable, did not state
willingness to overrule Adkins, and absent a
fifth vote Roberts was not willing to join the
three liberals in supporting that result.
The theory might seem immediately implausible, as Cushman recognizes, because Hughes
did, after all, write the opinion overrulingAdkins
just one year later. It seems unlikely, therefore,
that his procedural resistance to overruling
Adkins in Tipaldo would be so great that he
would refuse to join with Roberts and the three
liberals in doing so if he realized that in this
way he could achieve the result-upholding
the statute-that
he strongly favored in
fipaldo. Cushman suggests that there was a
massive failure to communicate, Roberts never
letting Hughes know that a square overrule was
the price of getting his vote. And Cushman
properly points to two aspects of Hughes’ style
as Chief Justice-tautly run Conferences, without open-ended conversations, and a refusal
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to lobby his Brethren outside the Conference20-that make such a failure conceivable.
Intriguing as Cushman’s speculation is, I
ultimately find it unpersuasive, for several reasons. First, Hughes’ antipathy to Adkins was
clear. His Epaldo dissent did not merely distinguish Adkins; it discarded the case. Adkins,
wrote Hughes,2’had been a “closely divided”
case, following an equal division of the Court
in another minimum wage case, Stettler v.
o ’ H a ~ - aa, ~few
~ years before. Given the fact
that Adkins was not “a precise authority” for
the statute before the Court in Epaldo, and the
“grave importance” of the question posed by
Tipaldo, he wrote that the Court “should deal
with that question upon its merits,” without
being bound by Adkins-and then he presented six pages of analysis citing Nebbia and
other liberal precedents, but Adkins not at all.
Second, Cushman’s theory supposes an
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odd combination of positions on the part of
Roberts, Roberts would have had to believe
that it was appropriate in the circumstances to
overruleAdkins-notwithstanding the fact that
the grant of certiorari did not raise that question and the state did not clearly raise it-but
that if there was not a majority for that result
then the outcome of the case should be
changed and the statute be invalidated. In other
words, Roberts’ rank ordering of preferences
must have been: (1) Uphold the statute by overruling Adkins by majority vote. ( 2 ) Invalidate
the statute by joining the conservatives to hold
that Adkins was indistinguishable, without reaffirming the continued validity of Adkins. (3)
Uphold the statute by joining the liberals in
forming a four-member plurality to hold that
Adkins should be overruled, the fifth vote in
the majority being that of Hughes, whose opinion would give no basis for believing that

Professor Cushman explains that Justice Pierce Butler (inset) rested the majority opinion in Morehead v. New York in ex.rel. Tipaldo (1936) on narrow ground
because Justice Roberts insisted on it as price of his vote for overturning the
minimum wage law in question. Above is Children’s Hospital in Washington,
D.C., where women workers were subject to an earlier minimum wage law set
by Congress. The Court overturned that law in Adkins v. Children’s Hospital
(1923),before Hughes and Robertsjoined the Court. Butler’s opinion in Tipaldo
contained language reaffirming Adkins.
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Adkins retained any vitality. This ranking, it ~elf-serving.”~~
But in this case, in part because
seems to me, would be bizarre. Option (2) should on this matter his statement works against his
be either at the top of the heap or at the bottom, interest, I am for taking Justice Roberts at his
not in the middle.
word: Given his perception that New York had
Third Roberts, at the same time, must have not asked the Court to overrule Adkins, he did
been unwilling-either at the Conference or at not think that it was appropriate to do so. It
any subsequent time-to say in effect, “Chief was not the absence of a pro-overruling maJustice, if you’ll go a little further and overrule jority that caused him to take this position.
Adkins I’m with you, but failing that I have to
The question remains why New York’s
vote to hold this statute unconstitutional.” failure to ask squarely for overruling would
Hughes may have been intimidating at Con- have constrained Roberts, leading him to a reference, but he did not have a gag. The case sult he did not favor. Viewed from a distance
was of sufficient importance that, if Roberts of sixty years, Hughes did enunciate some
believed the proper result was to overrule fairly clear distinctions that one might expect
Adkins and failure to do so would be outcome- to be palatable to a Justice disposed not to foldeterminative,it is hard to believe that he would low Adkins. But it is not implausible that Robnot have articulated that view when the Court erts was unpersuaded. And perhaps his unwillingness to overrule Adkins in the absence of a
was deciding the case.
Fourth, on this account not only must clear request was also a matter of scruple. But
Hughes have failed to pick up on the fact that the scruple does not have much self-evident
merely by expressing willingness to overrule appeal. New York did, after all, ask that the
Adkins he could do it; the three liberals must Court reconsider Adkins in light of changed
also have failed to pick up on it, for if they did circumstances, and while this does not go the
it seems highly likely, given the stakes at is- full length of asking for an overrule, it goes
sue, that at least one of them would have raised quite far. If Roberts was confident that Adkins
should be overruled, one might expect that he
the matter with Hughes.
Finally, this account is inconsistent with would be comfortable in reaching that result
Roberts’ own rendition of the affair. Roberts notwithstanding the limited nature of New
did later recall that at the Conference in which York’s argument. And the mystery is comthe Court decided to grant the writ of certio- pounded by the fact that, when he did vote to
rari in Tipaldo he said that he “saw no reason” overrule Adkins in West Coast Hotel, he did SO
to do so “unless the Court were prepared to re- despite the fact that the state of Washington,
examine and overrule the Adkins case.”23But, like New York before it, had not asked for that
as he saw the case, the State did not, in peti- result!26
I have previously suggested that Roberts’
tioning for certiorari or in briefing or arguing
the case, ask that Adkins be overruled. The ar- own judicial timidity may have had something
guments that Adkins could be distinguished to do with his curious behavior. Cushman propseemed to him “to be disingenuous and born erly points out that in some notable instancesof timidity,” and he did not believe they were the Nebbia opinion on the left and Retirement
sound: “At Conference I so stated, and stated Board v. Alton R.R. Co.,” “in which he bludhrther that I was for taking the State of New geoned the Railroad Retirement Act to death,”28
York at its word. The State had not asked that on the right-Roberts was anything but timid.
the Adkins case be overruled but that it be dis- And yet at least part of Roberts’ behavior in
tinguished. I said I was unwilling to put a deci- Tipaldo seems unmistakably to reflect a sort of
sion on any such ground.”24Roberts’ memo- timidity: He failed to write separately, despite
randum on this matter, I have said elsewhere, the fact that the majority opinion clearly
is “maddeningly incomplete, inaccurate, and adopted a position that he must have found
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appalling (and in Cushman’s account, he failed
even to state his mind clearly in Conference). I
continue to regard Roberts’ behavior in these
cases as my~terious.~~
It may be that the firestorm of criticism of
Tipaldo-from Republicans as well as from
Democrats-had some impact on Roberts; I
suspect it made him more willing to reach the
merits in West Coast Hotel than he might have
been otherwise. It did not take the election returns of 1936 for Roberts to realize how unpopular Tipaldo was; all he had to do was read
accounts of how, the week after the decision,
the Republican convention and its prospective
nominee, Alf Landon, took strong positions in
favor of minimum wage legislation and its constitutionality. Moreover, it appears that Roberts signaled his vote in West Coast Hotel in
October, when he voted to hear the case, rather
than summarily reversing the judgment of the
Washington Supreme Court upholding the statute or remanding the case for reconsideration
in light of Tipaldo. And in any event it is now
well understood that Roberts cast his vote in
West Coast Hotel before Roosevelt announced
his Court-packing plan.
Like Cushman, therefore, I agree that the
supposed “switch” of Roberts on the minimum
wage provides no good basis for a political
account of the Court’s decision-making. Roberts’ vote in West Coast Hotel is what one
would expect from the author of Nebbia. His
vote in Tipaldo is an anomaly that escapes easy
explanation. The double-switch explanation
that some “political story” advocates favorthat despite Nebbia Roberts conscientiously
favored the merits of Adkins at the time of
Tzpaldo and then switched buck, like an evasive halfback, in West Coast Hotel as a result of
political pressure-seems quite implausible.
One of the other key cases on which the
“political story” advocates have based their
argument is Jones & Luughlin, which together
with its companion cases not only upheld the
Wagner Act-more formally, the National
Labor Relations Act-but also seemed to signal a significantly broader view of the commerce
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power than had previous decisions. To
Cushman, however, the Wagner Act cases were
nothing but a predictable, though then controversial, application of the prevailing commerce
power doctrine of the time, as adjusted in light
of Nebbia.
The Court had often enunciated the principle that productive industries-principally
agriculture, manufacture, and mining-were
not part of commerce, and, like intrastate transactions, were subject to state rather than federal control. But, beginning early in the twentieth century, the Court had also held that activities that were in the “stream” or “flow” or
“current” of commerce, even if themselves not
constituting interstate commerce, could be
brought within the federal power. The reach
of this latter doctrine, Cushman argues, was
confined by the same “affected with a public
interest” limitationthat shaped substantive due
process jurisprudence; Congress could regulate only businesses meeting that description.
But when this limitation gave way in the due
process context in Nebbia, the floodgates were
also opened for an expansive application of the
“stream of commerce” theory.
Cushman regards this theory as having
played a fundamental role inJones & Laughlin
and its companion cases.3oI am not fully persuaded. The Court had rather rigorously adhered to the distinction between commerce and
production; as Cushman points out, shortly
before the Labor Act decisions, a Senate committee, reporting out the Bituminous Coal Conservation Act of 1937, acknowledgedthat “[iln
light of the decisions of the Supreme Court,
control of production is apparently beyond
congressional power.” True, some inputs for
the businesses involved in the Labor Act decisions had come from out of state, but the manufacturing process had “materially changed” the
“character,utility, and value” of those inputs.’’
It would have required a significant expansion
of “stream of commerce” theory for the Court
to apply it to these cases. The government gave
the theory a very subsidiary position in its brief
And Chief Justice Hughes’ opinion for the
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Justice Roberts voted with the conservatives in Carferv. Carter Coal Co., which invalidatedthe Bituminous Loai
Conservation Act of 1935, but switched his vote the foflowing year in theJones & Laughlin case to support the
government. The mining industry was hard hit in the Depression and the ensuing unemployment devastated
rural mining communities. Above is a West Virginia coal mine photographed by Marion Post Wolcott in 1938.

majority expressly declined to concludewhether
the facts of the Jones & Laughlin case fit the
“stream of commerce” theory.32
Instead, Hughes relied on a broader theory,
that Congress has authority to protect interstate commerce against burdens and obstructions from whatever source. The basic theory
was well grounded; Hughes’ own opinion in
the Shreveport Rate Cases’3 nearly a quartercentury before, when he was an Associate Justice, was one of its most important bulwarks. It
made perfect sense for the theory to be applied
to production, and so Hughes’ majestic opinion doing just that removed a doctrinal
anomaly. Even this application had been foreshadowed by Hughes. “The interests of producers and consumers are interlinked,” he had
written in Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United
States.34 “When industry is grievously hurt,
when producing concerns fail, when unemployment mounts and communities dependent upon
profitable production are prostrated, the wells
of commerce go dry.”

Roberts’ prior record gave no such indication that he would support the government in
Jones & Laughlin and its companions. Indeed,
his vote with the conservatives the prior year
in Carter v. Carter Coal C O . ,which
~ ~ invalidated the Bituminous Coal Conservation Act
of 1935, suggested that he would come out the
other way. Cushman attempts to distinguish
Carter, as did the government, but the distinctions appear rather thin to me. It is notable that
Hughes’ opinion in Jones & Laugldin, which
Robertsjoined, made no attempt to distinguish
Carter. Instead, Hughes simply said that “the
[Carter]Court was of the opinion that the provisions of the statute relating to production
were invalid upon several
in other
words, Carter’s commerce power discussion
should not be taken seriously because the Court
had relied on other grounds as well.
It seems to me that Jones & Laughlin does
represent some movement on Roberts’ part. But
that does not provide any strong basis for adopting a political explanation. The opinions of
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individual judges, as well as doctrine, evolve.
Modern day observers should recognize the
phenomenon by considering the career of Justice Harry A. Blackmun-who did not need external political pressure to transform from one
of the most conservative to one of the most
liberal members of the Court. I do not go quite
as far as Cushman does in reading Nebbia as
forecasting Roberts’ vote in Jones & Laughlin.
But it cannot be altogether surprising that a
judge who would reject a categorical doctrine
limiting the class of industries of sufficient
public interest to be regulated would similarly
reject a doctrine refusing to treat production as
sufficiently related to commerce to justify national regulation.
What is more, after the political trauma of
1937 was over, neither Hughes nor Roberts
retreated from the commerce power ground
they took in Jones & Laughlin; indeed, they
joined the further advances in that power driven
by the new members of the Court appointed
by Roosevelt. And yet, as Cushman shows in
depth, in areas where they had been conservative before, they remained conservative. In
short, the evidence does not rebut the premise
that these were judges, trying to shape the law
and decide cases as they conscientiously
thought best.

* * *
To a considerable extent, I have focused
in this review on questions on which I disagree
with Cushman, or at least where I am not yet
persuaded by him. I have done this at least in
part because it seems to me that doing so makes
a review more interesting and more useful, and
perhaps also in part because I am an ornery
soul. But I do not want this orientation to cloud
my admiration for this book, or for the magnitude of Cushman’s achievement. By treating
the work product of the Justices seriously,
across a very broad sweep of time and substantive areas, he has shown how an integrated
body of doctrine exerted an intellectual force
of its own. Cushman is not naive; he does not
suggest that the way this doctrine evolved was

323

independent of the ideologies and personalities of the Justices who implemented it. On the
contrary, he quite properly gives this personal
element great prominence. Those who believe
that the constitutional transformation of the
1930s must have been the response to political
pressure of a political body cannot responsibly ignore his account. And they cannot effectively respond to it unless, like him, they are
willing to get their hands very dirty, delving
very deeply into the details from which any
sound understanding on the grand scale must
emerge.
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”From Roberts’ memorandum of November 1945, reproduced in Felix Frankfurter, “Mr. Justice Roberts,”
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241d.(emphasis added).
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L. Rev. 1985, 1995 (1994).
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L. Rev. at 1950-51.
*’295 U.S. 330 (1935).
28P. 263.
290ne scholar has said that I “end . . . in a fog” in
discussing Roberts’ vote in West Coast Hotel. Pepper,
supra note 13, at 77. Sometimes, though, the record
leaves matters unclear, and an historian acts respon-

sibly by acknowledging that lack of clarity. In other
words, blame Roberts, not me.
’“Pp. 173-75.
’IArkadelphia Milling Co. v. St. Louis S.K Ry., 249
U.S. 134, 151 (1919), quoted in Carter v. Carter Coal
Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936). In Cnrter, involving mining, the Court refused to apply the “stream of commerce” theory because commerce had not yet begun.
But presumably much of the machinery and other
inputs involved in mining had traveled from out of
state.
’*301 U.S. at 36.
33234U.S. 342 (1914).
34288U.S. 344, 372 (1932).
3s298 U.S. 238 (1936). Hughes also voted to invalidate part of the statute involved in Carter. He did not
join the majority opinion, however, and for various
reasons I believe that this vote does not undermine
the conclusion that Jones & Laughlin reflected his
conscientious beliefs. See “Switching Time,” 142 U.
Pa. L. Rev. at 1962-67.
36301U.S. at 41.

